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I. INTRODUCTION 
Binding on all members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”)1 aimed to create a standard of international property protection.2  In 
particular, Article 39.3 of TRIPS requires WTO members to protect the secret 
test data that originator pharmaceutical companies submit for regulatory 
approval of New Chemical Entities (NCE) against “disclosure” and “unfair 
commercial use.”3  Notably, however, Article 39.3 goes no further in defining 
these constitutive terms, a deliberate maneuver designed to give WTO members 
the freedom to interpret the parameters of the Article’s prohibition against 
disclosure and unfair commercial use.  In effect, this latitude allows members 
to set their own rules and to implement the Article by adopting an approach that 
takes account of national individuality. 
The importance of the interpretive freedom that Article 39.3 allows WTO 
members is reflected in the varied approaches to test data protection adopted 
by member countries: test data protection approaches differ along the lines of 
how the “unfair commercial use” obligation found in Article 39.3 is construed.  
Some of these approaches are considered public health-friendly more than data 
exclusivity.4  In practice, the permissive language of Article 39.3 permits a 
government to authorize a generic product based on an earlier grant of 
regulatory approval for the original product without running afoul of the 
Article’s prohibition on disclosing test data submitted by the original 
company.5 
This article discusses different protection approaches.  The first approach 
bans any policy that ultimately allows direct entry of generic products (i.e. 
misappropriation).  The second approach is a cost-sharing mechanism that 
 
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm.  For a general 
outline of the TRIPS Agreement, see Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 
2016). 
2.  The World Trade Organization is an organization that facilitates trade relationships between 
nations, as well as a forum in which governments can negotiate trade agreements. What Is the WTO?, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/index.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).  
Operating under a system of global trade rules, the WTO functions as place for governments to resolve 
trade problems and settle trade-related disputes. Id. 
3.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39. 
4. Anthony Taubman, Unfair Competition and the Financing of Public-Knowledge Goods: The 
Problem of Test Data Protection, 3 OXFORD J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 594, 595 (2008). 
5.  Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exlusivity Under United States and European Union Law, 
59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 484–485 (2004). 
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ensures higher political acceptance and still meets the obligations of Article 
39.3 of the TRIPS agreement to prevent unfair commercial use.  The third 
approach is protecting clinical pharmaceutical test data submitted to regulatory 
agencies from generic drug manufacturing application (i.e. data exclusivity).  
Under the data exclusivity approach, a comparison to patents and their relation 
to compulsory license are discussed.  The fourth approach allows releasing the 
data exclusively protected in certain public health variants, which mitigate the 
effect of data exclusivity. 
After discussing these distinct approaches to test data protection, I will then 
consider the implementation of test data protection in the United States, 
Canada, and the European Union. I will conclude by comparing these 
approaches with the demonstrably less restrictive approaches to test data 
protection employed by both India and Egypt. 
II. DIFFERENT PROTECTION APPROACHES 
A. Bans on Misappropriation 
 Taking maximum advantage of the flexibilities afforded by the broad 
language of the TRIPS Agreement, this first approach is considered to facilitate 
the early entry of a generic product directly after the original product is 
approved.6 Operationally, the ban-on-misappropriation approach prohibits 
government officials from disclosing an originator’s submitted test data to a 
third party, but it empowers them to rely on these data to grant marketing 
approval of a generic product.7  This approach finds legitimacy in several areas.  
Initially, the predicate interpretation of “unfair commercial use” utilized is 
consistent with the text of Article 39.3.  Here, unfairness is limited to the means 
of access to the data by the competitor, not by the regulators.8  Furthermore, 
according to Article 39.3 of the TRIPS agreement, it is required to protect test 
data in accordance with domestic laws of unfair competition.9 Thus, the 
originator’s test data will be protected against that which the relevant national 
law defines as unfair use of the data.10  Under this scenario, reliance on original 
test data when assessing the bioequivalence study of a generic company will 
not be considered to be an unfair use. 
 In general, the ban-on-misappropriation approach is considered to be a 
 
6.  Anthony Taubman, supra note 4. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. 
9.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39. 
10. Pamela Andanda, Managing Intellectual Property Rights Over Clinical Trial Data to 
Promote Access and Benefit Sharing in Public Health, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION 
L. 140, 147 (2013). 
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valuable alternative to the data exclusivity approach for developing countries;11 
some countries—Argentina, for example—recognized the advantages of test 
data protection and consequently went on to implement the approach.12  Two 
such advantages include (1), the generic product will reach the market as 
quickly as possible, with no need to repeat the clinical test data; and (2), it is a 
simple approach to implement, because no regulatory burdens are imposed on 
the government.13 
 Conversely, numerous arguments have been leveled against this 
approach. First, the ban-on-misappropriation approach will undermine 
originator companies’ investments in Research & Development (R&D).  
Second, this strategy will deny fair return to originator companies by allowing 
generic companies to unfairly free ride on their investment.14  However, both 
of these alleged failings of the ban-on-misappropriation approach may be of 
limited applicability in the milieu of a developing country.15  In such countries, 
the originator already has a large incentive to conduct R&D under a patent 
system. Also, developing countries have a small share of the global 
pharmaceutical market, so their policies will not affect the R&D investment 
decisions of the originator companies.16 
 Additionally, implementing a strong intellectual property system does 
not affect the decision of the originator companies to invest more in those 
countries.17  On the contrary, we can see that originator companies have made 
many investments in Egypt, which offers limited IP protection but have not 
made such investments in Jordan, which has adopted an expansive IP protection 
program.18 
 Model language for the misappropriation approach is “[g]overnment 
authorities shall prohibit misappropriation of test or other data submitted to 
obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products 
which utilize new chemical entities, except where necessary to protect the 
public; government authorities shall not disclose such data.”19 
 
11.  Id. 
12.  See id.  
13.  Id. 
14.  Robert Weissman, Public Health-Friendly Options for Protecting Pharmaceutical 
Registration Data, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 113, 115–17 (2006). 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Rohit Malpani, All Costs, No Benefits: How TRIPS-Plus Intellectual Property Rules in the 
US-Jordan FTA Affect Access to Medicines, 102 OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER 5 (2007), 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/all%20costs,%20no%20benefits.pdf. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Weissman, supra note 14, at 118. 
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B. Compensatory regime or cost-sharing approach to registration data 
1.  Overview of Cost-Sharing Approach 
 According to this cost-sharing approach to data protection, a generic 
company may rely on the originator’s submitted test data in its bid to attain 
regulatory approval if, and only if, the generic company offers fair 
compensation for the data to the originator company.20  The key elements of 
this approach are: the cost of generating data must be documented;21 the generic 
company will pay a share of the costs apportioned to each national market;22 
and avoiding overcompensation for originator data by taking into account the 
following criteria:23 if the originator product is covered by a patent, then no 
compensation will be paid.24 
If the sales of the originator product earn multiple (20 times) its cost in 
generating test data, then no compensation from generic companies.25 
The right to compensation expires five years after the originator product 
obtained marketing approval.26  The generic company will pay for the period 
they will be using the data during the course of the five years.27 
2. Compliance with Article 39.3 
The cost-sharing approach meets Article 39.3 obligations to prevent unfair 
commercial use. 
3.  Advantages of Cost-Sharing Approach 
The cost-sharing approaches has numerous advantages.28   
It will avoid the free-rider problem,29 as it requires the generic companies 
to share the cost of the clinical trials done by the originator company.30   
It will encourage the originator to invest more in developing new 
 
20.  Id. 
21.  Weissman, supra note 14, at 112–124.  
22.  Id. 
23.  Id.  
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id..  
28.  Brandon Powell, Silence Is Not the Best Medicine: Requiring Disclosure of Clinical Trial 
Data for Abandoned Drugs, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 571, 591 (2012).  See also FDA 101: Clinical Trials 
and Institutional Review Boards, FDA (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/Consume
rUpdates/ucm134723.htm. 
29.  See id.  
30.  Id. 
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products.31   
It adds value to abandoned drugs; an originator company can benefit from 
its abandoned products because it will receive a percentage of the gross sales 
from the competitor who wishes to proceed in this drug.32   
It will reduce the costs of drug development, since the cost-sharing system 
compensates a company for research that otherwise would have generated zero 
income for it.  As a result of this compensation, the company will in turn charge 
a lower price for the drug,33 with the aggregate effect of this causal relationship 
being industry-wide cost reductions.   
It will benefit the scientific community because this approach mandates the 
disclosure of the test data; consequently, knowledge will be increased, 
resources are conserved and more drugs will be produced.34 
4. Problems with Cost-Sharing Approach 
 The principal problem with this regime is that this fair compensation 
requirement may exceed generic companies’ financial capacity. There are 
disadvantages of the cost sharing approach.35 
The system is complicated or difficult to administer.36  However, any such 
administrative difficulties are lessened when the cost-sharing system at issue 
allows a generic producer to establish an automatic right to rely on originators’ 
data; in this scenario, the only dispute or administrative difficulty will concern 
the amount of compensation.  Even on this potential administrative morass, the 
U.S.’s approach to handling the amount of compensation points to ways to 
simplify the process of compensation.37  Moreover, there is a suggestion that 
the Drug Regulatory Authority should substitute a royalty payment.38 
Other disadvantages include over-compensating of originator companies 
for test data, which consequently increases the cost charged to consumers.39  
The response to this objection is that the actual cost for the generic companies 
will be modest, especially in smaller market.40 
 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Weissman, supra note 14, at 120–24. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. 
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5.  Issues with Calculating Costs Under this Approach 
 Most disputes under the cost-sharing system concern how to calculate 
the actual costs of generating test data incurred by the originator company.  In 
practice, dispute arbitrators will usually reduce the estimates submitted by the 
originator company.41  To resolve disputes over the validity of a particular 
company’s estimates, two predicate questions must be addressed. First, what is 
the appropriate methodology with which to calculate the originator company’s 
expenditure? Second, does this estimate include the cost of failed molecules? 
 As to the second inquiry regarding the financial value of an originator 
company’s failed attempts, it is important to determine the extent to which the 
failed efforts ultimately contributed to the successful molecule’s market entry.42  
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and the 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) 
report that for every 5,000 drugs tested, an average of only five make it to 
clinical trials, and only one of these is ultimately approved for patient use.43  
This data confirms that such failed efforts are a common occurrence.  Thus, the 
data lends validity to the originator company’s attempt to pass some portion of 
the costs associated therewith onto a generic producer.  Though a generic 
producer may seek to utilize the originator’s final test data, this sought-after 
information may owe its existence to the lessons learned from earlier failed 
attempts. 
Another question involving how to calculate the originator’s costs 
considers what is the appropriate percentage of said costs to be allotted to each 
company.  Specifically, should the apportionment be similar for all companies 
in all countries,44 regardless of both the country’s market share?  Should this 
determination consider how many generic competitors are requesting 
marketing approval, or how long the originator product has been in the 
market?45 
 Mr. Robert Weissman drafted a model for the cost-sharing approach, in 
which a generic company will pay a percentage of the originator’s documented 
cost that is based on the market share in which the generic product will be 
 
41. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Article: Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in 
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPS Agreement, 45 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 479 (2004). 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Jerome H. Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data Under the TRIPS Agreement and 
Its Progeny: A Broader Perspective, ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Moving Pro-development IP 
Agenda Forward: Preserving Public Goods in Health, Education and Learning, Bellagio, Nov. 29–Dec. 
3, 2004, available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Reichman_Bellagio4.pdf. 
45.  Id. 
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sold.46  Under the Weissman cost-sharing model, compensation will be divided 
according to the number of generic companies seeking marketing approval.47  
The amount of compensation will be subject to case-by-case negotiation, and 
will not stand in the way of a generic use or of reliance on the data to obtain 
marketing approval.48 
A simple model was proposed to avoid litigation, in which the generic 
companies pay reasonable royalty from their gross sales for a specified period, 
not to exceed five years.49  In this model, compensation correlated to its value 
to each generic company, a valuation based upon its sales.  Until 1992, Canada 
used to impose a four percent royalty on the right to use patented 
pharmaceuticals.50  The royalty percentage can vary according to each country, 
from one to four percent.  In other words, the disadvantage of this model is the 
overcompensation of the originator company.51 
Additionally, there are two other notable models of cost calculation: the 
Simple Divisions Royalties Model and the more-sophisticated Readjustable 
Royalties Model.  The following discussion of these two models utilizes an 
analysis by Professor Fellmeth. 
a. The Simple Division Royalties Model 
In this model, all drug registrants will pay fixed cost-sharing.  Here, the 
originator company has the burden to prove the cost of submitted trials required 
to gain the drug marketing approval.52  Once validated, this cost will then be 
divided by the number of the registrants in any given year,53 and all registrants 
will share an equal percentage of the total cost.54 
The difference between the Simple Division Royalties Model and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) is that no exclusivity period will 
be provided for the originator company, which allows a generic company to 
request registration immediately after proving that its product is bioequivalent 
to the originator’s.55  Also, this model differs from the FIFRA model by having 
 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International 
Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
1, 31–32 (2009). 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Fellmeth, supra note 41, at 481–82. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
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a fixed cost-sharing, and it will not involve any arbitral procedure that will 
delay the entrance of the generic product.56 
A significant disadvantage of this model is that the generic company will 
have to pay a large percentage of the clinical trials cost, a cost which generic 
companies in developing countries cannot afford.57  Moreover, this model does 
not account for all the generic producers requesting marketing approval.  
Predictably, not all generic producers will enter the market at exactly the same 
time; the Simple Divisions Royalties Model, however, does not address the 
staggered market entry of generic producers and the calculation protocol this 
model does provide would create a messy procedure in the calculation of the 
right percentage.58 
This model’s insufficiency is further demonstrated by the point that some 
generic companies may not enter the market after gaining the marketing 
approval, so it is not fair to correlate it to marketing approval if no real 
marketing has happened.59 
b. The Readjustable Royalties Model 
This model links the market access benefits with the costs obtaining this 
access.60 The subsequent generic companies will pay a royalty for 
predetermined years after gaining marketing approval.  Many mathematical 
formulae were proposed to apply this model.  One of these formulae proposes 
a higher royalty on the first generic companies, as they will gain the greatest 
benefits.  Under this calculus, companies will eventually be paid a lower royalty 
as the benefit they will gain will be less from the initial ones.61  In this proposed 
formula, the originator will not recover more than the 80% of its cost, and the 
higher the number of generic competitors, the more of its cost will be 
recovered.62 
The flexibility of this model is one of its key strengths, as formulae can be 
changed to allow negotiation on critical issues, such as how many generic 
companies should pay the royalty, and for how long the royalty should be paid. 
Moreover, this model ensures that the originator will not recover more than 
100% of its real cost.63  If applied properly, this model will foster competition 
in the market and will disperse the cost of the clinical trials among all available 
 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id.. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. at 482–99. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id.  
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competitors.64 
6. How U.S. Utilizes Cost-Sharing Approach 
 This approach is consistent with the U.S.’s position and ensures higher 
political acceptance.65  U.S. law has already established a version of the cost-
sharing approach for agricultural chemical registration under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).66  The difference is that 
in this model, there is an exclusive period, which is followed by an automatic 
right to use the registration data after paying compensation royalties. 
 It may be noted that cost-sharing approach did not appear in any FTA 
signed with the United States, as they were able to include the harsher approach 
that is data exclusivity.67 
7. Cost-Sharing approach & Developing Countries 
 However, developing countries can be in a good position to negotiate a 
cost sharing approach—more than the bans on misappropriation approach—to 
challenge the demand of the United States for data exclusivity approach.68 
 Recently, this approach was successfully negotiated by the Korean 
government in its FTA with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).69  
Moreover, the Indian government has considered the cost sharing approach as 
one of several options, while resisting data exclusivity in its negotiation with 
the USTR.70 
C. Data Exclusivity Approach 
 Under the data exclusivity approach, the interests of the originator 
company are paramount; in effect, this approach creates a new monopoly for 
originator companies, even when there is no patent registered.71  Moreover, the 
data exclusivity regime also seeks to accommodate, to the greatest extent, the 
interests of the originator companies; a feat this approach accomplishes by 
 
64.  Id. at 481–82. 
65.  Reichman, supra note 44, at 15–16. 
66.  Id.; see also Weissman, supra note 14, at 10. 
67.  Id. 
68.  Reichman, supra note 44, at 15–16. 
69.  Reichman, supra note 49, at 34.  
70.  Id. 
71.  See, e.g., Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in 
the context of innovation and market access, (2004), available at https://www.iprsonline.org/unctadic
tsd/bellagio/docs/Pugatch_Bellagio3.pdf (discussing how the European Commission, a High Level 
Group, was tasked with “propos[ing] a new agenda to improve the framework for competitiveness in 
the pharmaceutical industry to improve the framework for competitiveness in the pharmaceutical 
industry.”). 
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delaying the entry of generic products for a fixed time period.72 
 Developed countries have implemented this approach in their drug 
regulatory system.73  The two existing prototypes are the U.S. and the European 
Union.74  The U.S. includes this in section 355 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act of 1997.75  The period of data exclusivity in the U.S. is five years 
for NCEs, and three years for new uses of old drugs.76  Endorsing an even more 
expansive data protection period than the U.S., in December of 2003, the 
European Parliament harmonized the level of data exclusivity to “8 years data 
exclusivity plus 2 years as marketing exclusivity and one additional year for 
new use of old entity.”77 
 The supporters of data exclusivity have justified it as the only means 
available to encourage research and development in new pharmaceutical 
products and to guarantee fair compensation for the efforts made by the 
originator companies.78  It should be noted that the years between the late 1990s 
and early 2000s saw a decline in the number of new drugs approved: in 1996, 
fifty-three NCEs were approved and by 2000, that number had fallen to only 
twenty NCEs approved as most research-based companies focus development 
of new delivery systems and new uses.79 
The disadvantages of data exclusivity include the following: it will delay 
the entry of generic products in the market, thus impeding consumer access to 
affordable medicine;80 it is unethical to ask the generic company to duplicate 
clinical trials;81 it is considered a form of double protection if there is a patent, 
as both are justified by the cost of investment;82 it can make compulsory 
licenses of patents ineffective;83 and the concept of data exclusivity is 
inconsistent with the legislative intent of the TRIPs Agreement: There is no 
uniform interpretation of Article 39.3, and data exclusivity was rejected by 
WTO members.84 
 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. at 22. 
83.  Id. 
84.  INT’L FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS & ASS’NS, 
ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY 3 
(2007) [hereinafter IFPMA]. 
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1. Data Exclusivity versus Patent 
Data exclusivity and patents are the most important intellectual property 
rights related to the pharmaceutical industry. 85  These two forms of IPR differ 
in terms of the scope, rights conferred, obligations, duration, and related 
authority.86  Legally, data exclusivity and patents are discrete forms of 
protection, mutually exclusive in their operation and effect. 
In addition, data exclusivity is the expression of a trade secret, which is in 
itself a distinct form of intellectual property.  The originator companies request 
such protection in exchange for submitting studies for approval in the Drug 
Regulatory Authority to recoup their cost in conducting such trials. 87  On 
average these trials cost $800 U.S. dollars and take ten to fifteen year to 
complete.  The fruits of these labors see one in every 5,000 molecules 
investigated obtain the FDA’s approval for marketing.88 
 A patent system was developed to encourage inventions in order to 
disseminate this knowledge for the public in order to benefit from it.  As 
concerns pharmaceuticals, patents are granted to the inventions, embodied in a 
new drug.89 
 The rights conferred by the patent are to exclude others from making, 
using, selling, offering for sale, importing, or circulating the patented product.90  
Data exclusivity prevents reliance on the originator test data, and thus limits the 
possibility of using these data to evaluate the generic product.91  Therefore, data 
exclusivity is considered to provide less expansive protection than patents, 
because it does not prevent other generic companies from generating their own 
data and then seeking marketing approval for their product.92 
A National Drug Regulatory Authority grants exclusivity automatically 
after the originator product has been approved for marketing, done without any 
request from the originator product company and irrespective of its patent 
 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87. Andy Gray, Access to Medicines and Drug Regulation in Developing Countries: A 
Resource Guide for DFID, DFID HEALTH SYSTEMS RESOURCE CENTRE 1, 1–4 (Oct. 2004), available 
at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18246en/s18246en.pdf. 
88.  Carlos M. Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Geochemical Products 
Under Free Trade Agreements 2, ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Moving the Pro-development IP 
Agenda Forward: Preserving Public Goods in Health, Education and Learning, Bellagio (Nov. 29–
Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/event/2008/12/report31.pdf. 
89.  Pugatch, supra note 71, at 22. 
90.  INT’L FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS & ASS’NS, DATA 
EXCLUSIVITY: ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 16–17 (2011), available at 
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Publication/IFPMA_2011_Data_Exclusivity__En_Web.pdf 
91.  Junod, supra note 5, at 484. 
92.  Pugatch, supra note 71, at 6–7. 
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situation.  In contrast, a patent is only granted if the patent owners take the 
affirmative effort of applying for one at the country’s patent office.93  
Additionally, applying for a patent is considered to be a complex and costly 
administrative procedure;94 a patent attorney and agent are needed to prepare 
the application and to pay the application fees and annual fees or otherwise it 
will be invalid.95  As opposed to the patent protection procedure, data 
exclusivity does not stand on such formalities in order to receive protection, as 
accomplished mainly by its automatically grant of protection following 
marketing approval.  Moreover, data exclusivity is considered to be a cheaper 
alternative to patent, since no administrative procedure or fees are required to 
obtain or maintain data exclusivity.96 
 To grant a patent, the invention should fulfill the patentability 
conditions, namely novelty, non-obviousness and industrial applicability.  The 
protection period is twenty years from the day of the patent application.97 
 Under data exclusivity, there are several conditions that must be met in 
order for data to be granted protection: first, the product at issue must be a new 
chemical entity (NCE) of pharmaceutical or agricultural products; second, the 
data must be unpublished; third, the generation of the data must have involved 
considerable efforts; and, finally, those data are requested, not submitted 
voluntarily, to get marketing approval.98 
 The duration and scope of data exclusivity varies between countries.99  
Jordan, for example, grants five years of protection for NCEs and three years 
for new use of an old chemical entity.100  Europe grants eight years data 
exclusivity plus two years as marketing exclusivity and one year for new use.101  
Other countries may not provide any data exclusivity and may apply other data 
protection approaches that are compliant with the mandates found in TRIPS 
Article 39.3.102 
 The unique importance of data exclusivity for originator companies 
appears in many situations.  An example is seen when there is no patent 
registered in that country.103 
 
93.  Id.  
94.  Junod, supra note 5, at 484. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id.  
97.  Id.  
98.  Id.  
99.  Pugatch, supra note 71, at 6–7. 
100. Id. 
101.  Id.  
102.  Id.  
103.  Junod, supra note 5, at 484–485.   
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This is the case in Jordan, in which data exclusivity was recognized as an 
alternative source of protection in a situation where most originator products 
not being protected through patents and data exclusivity was the alternative for 
this protection.104 
 Moreover, data exclusivity is important when the product cannot be 
patented, as happens with biological products and also where the new 
development of an old product lacks the novelty criteria.105 
 Data exclusivity can also provide protection where other forms of IPR 
cannot in a situation where the development period for the product was too long 
and took most of the patent duration.106  To this point, between 1998 and 2004, 
the U.S. FDA has approved 137 new drugs.107  Of these 137 products, 27 were 
developed without patent protection, and it is for these 27 products that data 
exclusivity provided some measure of protection where patent protection was 
no longer viable.108 
 The table below is taken from Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical 
Data Exclusivity, as presented in the context of innovation and market 
access;109 the calculations are based on the U.S. FDA Orange Book.110  This 
table gives examples for products where the protection granted by data 
exclusivity extended beyond the product’s patent term duration.111 
 
Table 1: Patent and data exclusivity expiration periods in the US for 
selected drugs.112 
 
   PRODUCT 
 
Taxol(Paclitaxel) Eprex 
(Epeotin 
Alpah) 
Arava 
(Leflunomide) 
Purpose Breast Cancer/ 
Ovarian Cancer and others 
Severe Anemia Rheumatoid 
Arthritis 
 
104.  Malpani, supra note 17, at 1. 
105.  Junod, supra note 5, at 485–86. 
106.  Id. at 487. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id.  
109.  Pugatch, supra note 71, at 6–7. 
110.  Id.; see also FDA, ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, 35TH ED. (2015), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. 
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U.S. Market 
Approval 
Discovered in 1962. 
Approved in 1994/1998. 
2000 1998 
U.S. Patent 
Expiration 
———————— 2004 2001 
U.S. DE 
Expiration 
2004(Orphan Drug) 2005 2003 
 
The following table illustrates the differences between patents and data 
exclusivity. 
Table 2: Differences between patents and data exclusivity. 
 
Parameter Patent Data exclusivity 
Rationale Encourage inventions 
by giving protection 
for 20 years in order 
to disseminate this 
knowledge for the 
public in order to 
benefit from it. 
Patents are granted to 
the inventions 
embodied in a new 
drug. 
Recoup originator 
companies cost in 
conducting clinical 
studies for approval 
in the Drug 
Regulatory Authority. 
 
Duration 
 
 
 
 
 
20 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differ from country 
to country.   
United States: 5 
years protection for 
new chemical entity 
and  years for new 
use of old chemical 
entity.  
Europe: “8 years 
data exclusivity plus 
2 years as marketing 
exclusivity and 1 year 
for new use”, Some 
countries do not 
provide data 
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exclusivity. 
Competent authority Patent Office/ 
Ministry of Industry. 
Drug Regulatory 
Authority 
Costs and administrative 
procedure 
Application fees and 
it should be paid 
annually to maintain 
the patent or 
otherwise it will be 
invalid 
No fees or 
follow-up needed 
Granting Procedure Applicant should 
apply for patent in the 
competent authority 
and then this 
application will be 
studied to check if the 
patent application 
fulfills the criteria 
then it can be granted 
or not. 
Automatic right is 
conferred from the 
date of marketing 
approval without any 
request or 
application. 
Preventing Generic 
Product Approval 
Generic company can 
submit its registration 
application to the 
DRA and the DRA 
can grant him 
marketing approval. 
Patent holder can stop 
the registration 
process, only by 
placing a law suit 
The DRA will 
prevent the marketing 
approval of any 
generic product till 
the end of the data 
exclusivity period 
Conditions Protects an invention, 
which must be novel, 
non-obvious and 
capable of industrial 
applications.  
New chemical entity. 
Undisclosed 
information. 
Considerable efforts. 
Condition of 
marketing approval. 
Public health/  
compulsory license 
Compulsory license 
can be issued to 
protect public health 
so a generic product 
can be produced. 
Compulsory license 
will not stop data 
exclusivity. 
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2. Effect of Data Exclusivity on Compulsory License 
Data exclusivity represents a barrier for generic product approval, even if a 
compulsory license is issued for this product.113  Compulsory licenses were 
conceived by the Council of TRIPs in August of 2003 in order to solve the 
problem raised by the Doha Declaration.114  The Doha Declaration emphasized 
members’ right to access to medicine to all, in this declaration it reconfirms 
member’s ability to issue compulsory licenses and to permit parallel 
importation.  Additionally, it proposed the extension of the transition period to 
implement and enforce patents in the least developed countries and their 
obligation to comply with data protection and mailbox-market-exclusivity 
rules.115  The gap in the Doha Declaration was that it did not limit the rights 
conferred by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement in case of issuance of 
compulsory license.116 
In past years, Canada issued compulsory licenses as a means to promote the 
generic pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, the United States targeted this 
system in 1987, with Canada ultimately acquiescing to U.S. pressure by passing 
Bill C-22, legislation that had the effect of weakening the compulsory license 
system as a whole.117  Nevertheless, Canada has established the PMPRB.118  
This independent body monitors the potential increase in drug prices.  If 
excessive prices were to be found, then they can remove the protection against 
compulsory license.119 
 In a country providing protection under data exclusivity regime, it will 
be difficult to implement the compulsory licensing system unless there is a clear 
provision to waive data exclusivity in the case of a compulsory license.120   
Chile has implemented this in article 91(b) through (e) of Decree 153 (2005).121  
This article listed four grounds under which data protection could be revoked, 
one of which is in the case of compulsory license issuance.  Regarding this 
 
113.  Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and 
Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 320–21 (2008). 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. 
117.  See Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. 41st Parliament, 2nd Session, 2013–2014, 
Bill C-22. 
118.  PMPRB, PATENTED MEDICINES PRICES REVIEW BOARD: ANNUAL REPORT 2013, 
available at http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/CMFiles/Publications/Annual%20Reports/2013/2013-
Annual-Report_2013-09-15_EN.pdf. 
119.  Katherine M. Van Maren, Bartering with a Nation’s Health or Improving Access to 
Pharmaceuticals? The United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 
801, 812 (2004). 
120.  Weissman, supra note 14, at 201. 
121.  See Chile’s Decree 153 
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exception to data exclusivity’s reach, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) 
included Chile on the priority watch list.  The USTR and big Pharma use the 
watch list and bilateral agreements as their weapon to impose data exclusivity 
and a linkage system.122  In 2006, the USTR placed forty-eight countries on the 
priority watch list, twenty-five of which were criticized for data exclusivity and 
patent-registration linkage.123  
 Avoiding the ire of the U.S., and in contrast to Chile’s position on scope 
of data exclusivity protection, the European Commissioner confirmed that a 
data exclusivity regime would disallow, or at least delay, European member 
states from using compulsory licenses to permit the market entry of a generic 
alternative to Tamiflu in case of a Bird Flu pandemic.124 
 Developing countries have requested assurances that data exclusivity 
and patent/registration linkage will not prevent the use of TRIPS flexibilities as 
a compulsory license.125  Therefore, the USTR issued side letters that reassure 
that the IPR provisions of the FTAs will not prevent access to medicines for 
all.126 
Developing countries should resist efforts by the United States to 
implement registration-related IPRs.127  If countries have already incorporated 
these provisions, as with Jordan, they should instead revise their national laws 
in order to mitigate the effects of these clauses based on the new trade policy 
of the United States for data exclusivity to allow exceptions to promote public 
health and access to medicines conforming to TRIPS and Doha Declaration.128 
D. Public Health Variants of the Data-Exclusivity Approach 
 Despite the data exclusivity’s privileging of originator companies, there 
are seven variants that may decrease the harmful effects of data exclusivity.129  
Unfortunately, some of these variants cannot be applied by some countries 
because of obligations found within their bilateral agreements.130  These 
variants are: 
 
122.  Baker, supra note 113, at 300. 
123.  Id; IFPMA, supra note 84. 
124.  Judit Sanjuan et al., Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data: A Policy Proposal, KEI 
RESEARCH PAPER 1 (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/data/CPTech-Test-
Data.pdf. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. at 331. 
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. at 342. 
129.  Correa, Protecting Test Data, supra note 88, at 11–12. 
130.  Id. 
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1. New Chemical Entities (NCEs): Restrict data exclusivity to New 
Chemical Entities (NCEs), this variant is in compliance with 
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. This excludes new uses of 
old chemical entities, new dosage forms or new methods of 
administering drugs.131 
2. Unpublished Information: Data exclusivity will be restricted to 
unpublished information.132  If the test data was published, then the 
generic companies can rely on this published data to prove the 
safety and efficacy in order to obtain the marketing approval by 
conducting the bioequivalence study only.133  Weissman said “tying 
data exclusivity to lack of disclosure gives pharmaceutical 
companies an incentive not to publish their clinical testing data.”134  
Unitectra is a Swiss technology transfer organization that supports 
scientists from Basel;135 Bern and Zurich Universities to 
commercialize their research results.136  This organization ensures 
that researchers’ rights to publish research results and the university 
will reserve the full publication rights, which will be delayed for a 
period of three months to enable the collaborating company to 
apply for patents.137 If the commercial company did not publish the 
research within one year, then the collaborating university has the 
right to do so to facilitate data sharing.138 
3. Waiving data-exclusivity protection in cases of compulsory 
licensing: In case of the issuance of a compulsory license, the 
generic company is still required to submit clinical trials.139  
Therefore, data exclusivity should be waived in such cases.140 
4. Waive data exclusivity protection in cases of having patent:141 
The basis of this waiver is that the originator will recoup his 
investment through the product patent, with no need for data 
exclusivity.142 
5. Compulsory licensing system for registration data: The proposal 
in this case is that countries should be free to determine conditions 
under which compulsory licenses should be granted over 
 
131.  Id. 
132.  Adanda, supra note 10, at 168–70. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Adanda, supra note 10, at 168–70. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. 
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registration data.143  Jordan cannot apply this variant, as the grounds 
for issuing compulsory license is specified in the JOR-US FTA.144 
6. Shortening the term of data exclusivity: Weissman stated that 
any country can decide to shorten the exclusivity years as the five 
or ten years were not based on any criteria.145 
7. Start date of data exclusivity: a country can consider the start date 
for granting data exclusivity is the first registration of the product 
worldwide.146 
These seven variants will ensure fair access to clinical data and it will 
reserve the intellectual right properties.147 
III. TEST DATA PROTECTION IMPLEMENTATION IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
Members of the WTO have applied the obligation of TRIPS Article 39.3 in 
different ways that suited their needs and interests.148  The United States and 
the European Union have applied the data exclusivity approach even prior to 
the TRIPS agreement.  According to the International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IFPMA), many countries have 
entered into bilateral or regional agreements, or adopted into their legislation 
data exclusivity regime to protect test data against unfair commercial use and 
disclosure.149  It should be noted that some countries, such as India, did not 
apply the data exclusivity approach through relying into the marketing approval 
of other countries.150 
I will discuss the practical implementation of different approaches of test 
data protection in the following countries: 
United States: The first country implemented data exclusivity 
system in 1984.  Many originator companies are based in the United 
States. Also, the United States has signed many bilateral 
agreements with the intent of encouraging other countries to follow 
suit by implementing their own data exclusivity approach. 
Canada: A developed country famous for its generic industry, 
 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Id. 
148.  SATWANT REDDY & GURDIAL SINGH SANDHU, REPORT OF STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY 
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN THE CONTEXT OF DATA PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 39.3 OF 
TRIPS AGREEMENT 13–15 (2007), available at http://chemicals.nic.in/DPBooklet.pdf. 
149.  G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required 
by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 49 (2003). 
150.  REDDY & SANDHU, supra note 148, at 13–15. 
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which adopted the data exclusivity approach in 1995 as a means to 
fulfill obligations required by NAFTA. 
The European Union: Many originator companies are based in the 
European Union; therefore, they have implemented data exclusivity 
approach in 1987. 
India: Famous for its generic industry and has been listed on the 
special 301 Priority Watch List since 1989.  The practice in India 
is to rely on other countries approval without requesting test data. 
Egypt: A developing Arab country, considers the reliance on the 
originator submitted data of the originator product to approve a 
generic product is not an act of unfair commercial use. 
A. United States 
Grounded in the Hatch-Waxman Act,151 data exclusivity became the chosen 
system in the United States beginning in1984.152  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
aimed to balance the rights of the originator company, so as to encourage them 
to invest more in discovering new products, with the need for access to 
medicine through the approval of generic companies.153  This act provides data 
exclusivity for five years for NCEs, calculated from the date of marketing 
approval of the originator’s product, and three years for new clinical 
information.154  Moreover, this act lengthened the patent duration from 
seventeen to twenty and granted a five-year patent term extension in order to 
compensate originators for administrative delays in patent registration.155 
In addition to the Hatch-Waxman Act there are two further types of 
marketing exclusivity: orphan drug exclusivity and pediatric exclusivity.156 
In the U.S., a five-year data exclusivity period is codified by federal 
statute,157 and provides that, during this five year exclusivity, the generic 
company cannot apply for registration of its generic.158  In practice, the generic 
product’s market entry will usually be delayed by approximately six-and-a-half 
 
151.  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 
101, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012) and 35 U.S.C. § 156) [hereinafter 
Wax-Hatchman Act]. 
152.  Shreya Matilal, Do Developing Countries Need a Pharmaceutical Data-exclusivity 
Regime? 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 268, 269 (2010). 
153.  Daniel Acquah, Extending the Limits of Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents and Data 
Outside the EU—Is There a Need to Rebalance? 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 256, 260–
61 (2014). 
154.  Id. 
155.  Id. 
156.  Junod, supra note 5, at 488–89.  
157.  21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D)(ii); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(ii) (2012). 
158.  Junod, supra note 5, at 493. 
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years.  This additional delay results because the FDA typically takes eighteen 
months to consider a generic candidate’s application,159 though the only 
condition that a generic producer must satisfy is to have a new chemical entity 
that had not previously been approved by the FDA.160  This marketing 
exclusivity is considered to be a very strong form of protection because it 
cannot be challenged, unlike a granted patent.161  The only case where the 
exclusivity period is reduced to four years is in the event a generic company 
challenges the validity of the patent and applies for certificate IV. 
As noted in the foregoing paragraph, the sole condition to be met predicate 
to the five-year exclusivity grant is that the product must be a new chemical 
entity that has never been approved in the FDA;162 thus, an applicant need not 
provide any evidence of significant therapeutic advance or innovation.  This 
application is usually submitted through a 505(b)(1) NDA application.  Ester 
and salt forms of a compound are not considered to be new chemical entities.163  
An enantiomer version of the racemate drug is also not considered to be as new 
chemical entity, but at best it may receive three years of exclusivity.164 
As with the five-year data exclusivity period, the corresponding three-year 
period of marketing exclusivity for new clinical information is incorporated by 
federal statute.165  Unlike the five-year exclusivity period, however, a generic 
company can apply for its ANDA file during the three-year exclusivity period, 
and get tentative approval.  This perk of the three-year period is available to 
both originator and generic companies.166  The new changes that can benefit 
from the three-year exclusivity period are new indication, new strength, and 
new dosage form, new routes of administration, new dosage schedule and new 
studied population.167 
A generic company can benefit from this marketing regime if it submits its 
own data.  Other conditions must be met to receive the three years of data 
exclusivity, including the requirement that the applicant should sponsor or 
conduct clinical trials that are germane to the data the producer must provide 
the regulatory authority in order to get approval of this new change.168 
This marketing exclusivity only protects the new change and not the already 
 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. at 492. 
162.  Id. at 494. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Junod, supra note 5, at 495. 
165.  21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D)(ii), (j)(5)(D)(ii) (2012). 
166.  Junod, supra note 5, at 494. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. 
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approved drug; so a generic company can market its product without the new 
addition.169 
The originator companies based in the United States are requesting a longer 
exclusivity period, like the one available in the European Union: that is, to 
extend the exclusivity period to ten years.170 
The marketing exclusivity information is available in the Orange Book 
website.171 
B. Canada 
In 1995, Canada implemented data exclusivity system into section 
C.08.004.1 of its Food and Drug Regulations.  This incorporation was a result 
of the obligations required by NAFTA.172  Specifically, Article 1711 of NAFTA 
requires the protection of confidential information submitted for governmental 
authorities for the purpose of approving a pharmaceutical product for five 
years.173  This was weakened by the judicial ruling of the Federal Court of 
Appeal in 1998 in the case of Bayer Inc. v. Canada.  The court held that the 
approval of a generic product on the basis of proving equivalency with the 
originator product with the bioequivalence study is not considered as 
reliance.174  In this case, Bayer had filed a new drug submission (Drug X) for a 
new product that had no patent and which had as its active ingredient one used 
previously in Drug Z, used for the treatment of certain animal disease.175  
Furthermore, the same active ingredient was used in Drug Y outside Canada to 
treat another human disease other than the one applied by Bayer.176  The issue 
in this case was whether to grant Bayer the five-year exclusivity period as per 
Canadian law, or whether to deny protection in this instance, since the active 
ingredient was already approved in Drug Z for animal disease.  The court held 
that the relevant law was applicable to Drug X. 
The aforementioned judicial interpretation broadens the application of data 
exclusivity to those drugs approved in Canada but not for human diseases.  
Subsequently, the Federal Court of Appeal held that Section C.08.004.1 does 
 
169.  Id. at 496. 
170.  Id. 
171.  Id. 
172.  Pei-kan Yang, Current Development of Canada’s Data Exclusivity Regime: How Does 
Canada React to NAFTA, TRIPS and Dangle Between Pharmaceutical Innovation and Public Health? 
4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 65 (2009). 
173.  Food and Drug Law Group, Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Developments in Canadian Law 
Relating to Food, Drugs, Devices, and Cosmetics as of December 1992, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 323, 
335 (1994). 
174.  Yang supra note 172, at 65. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. 
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not apply if the Minister did not physically examine the originator test data 
when approving a generic product.177  Therefore, the Minister can approve a 
generic product based on the bioequivalence study before the five-year period 
has elapsed.178  This rule was criticized by the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), which declared that this rule was not 
consistent with Canada’s NAFTA obligations; consequently, the United States 
included Canada on its Special 301 Watch List in 2003.179 
As a result of this pressure, the Canadian government amended its 
regulation in 2006.180  The new amendments extended the data exclusivity to 
eight years for a new chemical entity and six months for pediatric studies.  Also, 
it has extended the concept of reliance to cover the governmental examination 
of test data when approving a generic product.  Additionally, the generic 
company cannot file its product for six of the eight years in the exclusivity 
period, to then be followed by a two-year no-marketing period.  These 
amendments have been criticized for their negative impact on access to 
affordable medicines.181 
Despite such criticisms, however, the new amendments do contain some 
provisions that mitigate the negative impact of data exclusivity, such as 
narrowing the scope of protection to innovative drugs, meaning that new 
indications or dosage forms are not entitled to data exclusivity.182  An 
innovative drug is defined as “a drug that contains a medicinal ingredient not 
previously approved in a drug by the Minister and that is not a variation of a 
previously approved medicinal ingredient such as a salt, ester, enantiomer, 
solvate or polymorph.”183  The new data exclusivity regime is only applicable 
for innovative drugs that are marketed in Canada; if it was withdrawn from the 
market no data exclusivity will be offered.184  It should be noted in this context 
that an active ingredient that has been previously approved will not be granted 
the data exclusivity period 
Additionally, the new amendments encourage pediatric research by 
including a six-month exclusivity protection period if the generic producer’s 
application was filed within the first five years of the eight-year period.185  The 
new amendments allow the generic company to file under Canada’s Access to 
 
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. 
180.  Yang supra note 172, at 65. 
181.  Id. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id.  
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. 
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Medicines Regime (CAMR), during the new filing period of the six years.  
CAMR is only applicable to generic medicines imported to treat HIV/AIDS 
and malaria and other medicines to developing and least developed countries.  
This is grounded in C.07.003, Division 7 of Food and Drug Regulation entitled 
“Sale of Drugs for the Purposes of Implementing the General Council 
Decision”.186 
C. The European Union 
Prior to adopting the data exclusivity approach, the European Union 
protected pharmaceutical test data through established trade secrets law, with 
Union members employing different approaches to implementation.187  In 1987, 
the E.U. introduced the data exclusivity period, in which a generic product that 
is “essentially similar”188 may rely on the test data of the originator product 
after the expiration of the data exclusivity period.  The stated reason for this 
exclusivity period was in order to give the originator protection in countries 
that did not grant patents for medicinal products,189 such as in countries like 
Spain and Portugal that did not grant patents until 1992.  However, this 
rationale for mandating an exclusivity period is no longer applicable, as all the 
European countries grant strong patent protection to medicinal products.190  The 
directive of the data exclusivity was consolidated in 2001 in a single Code 
Directive 2001/83/EC.191  Data exclusivity is included in Article 10.1(a)(iii) of 
this Code Within the E.U.’s approach, the data exclusivity starts from the time 
of the first marketing approval of a medicinal product in any country 
maintaining membership in the E.U. There are four durations of data 
exclusivity provided by this article:192 
Ten-year mandatory period: for medicinal products that are 
approved through the centralized procedure at EMEA which is 
“high-tech” products.  High-tech products are biotechnology and 
products that represent a significant innovation or therapeutic 
advance.193 
 
186.  Id. 
187.  Matital, supra note 152, at 270. See also Sanjuan, supra note 124. 
188.  See Sanjuan, supra note 124. 
189.  Junod, supra note 5, at 205. 
190.  Id. at 502. 
191.  Directive 2001/83, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 
on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, 2001 O.J. (L 311), 67 (EC), 
replacing Council Directive 87/21, 1987 O.J. (L 015) 36 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:311:0067:0128:en:PDF. 
192.  Junod, supra note 5, at 503–04. 
193.  Id. 
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Six-year minimum period: for all medicinal products approved 
through either national or mutual recognition procedures.194 
Six-year minimum period capped by the patent duration: 
Greece, Spain and Portugal have chosen this option of data 
exclusivity period.  If a supplementary protection certificate is 
issued to cap for this period at the instant the patent protecting the 
medicinal product expires.195 
Ten-year optional period: members can either apply six or ten 
year data exclusivity period’s.  Extension of the period to ten years 
should be based on the necessity of public health and applied for all 
medicinal products without any discrimination.196  Members 
applied this duration are Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg.  The 
notion of “reliance” refers to reliance of the agency in the originator 
test data when approving the generic product which is similar to the 
United States interpretation.197 
The only requirement needed to grant data exclusivity in the European 
Union is that it must be a new medicinal product. This directive does not require 
that NCEs under consideration receive prior .198 
Unlike the United States, the European Union did not grant data exclusivity 
periods for the modification of the same medicinal product, such as with new 
indications. Additionally, in the European Union, a generic product can be 
marketed with the new modification after the expiration of the data exclusivity 
period granted to the original originator product.199  That approach was 
confirmed by the decision of the European Court of Justice in 1998.200 
In July 2001 the European Union initiated a revision of its legislation 
related to pharmaceuticals, including data exclusivity.201  The originator 
companies requested the harmonization of the data exclusivity period to be ten 
years,202 as the different durations created confusion.203  They also requested 
three years of data exclusivity for the modifications done on original medicinal 
products such as new indications, an approach similar to that of the United 
 
194.  Id. 
195.  Id. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. at 506. 
198.  Junod, supra note 5, at 506. 
199.  Id. 
200.  Id. at 508. 
201.  Id. at 511–14. 
202.  Id. 
203.  Id. 
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States.204  While the European generic industry requested the harmonization of 
the data exclusivity period between all the European Union members to be five 
years similar to the United States205 and rejected the line extension exclusivity 
period based on the decision held by the European Court of Justice in 1998.206  
In April 2004 the revised directive was published, and the implementation date 
was in October 30 2005.207 
The new revised directive is applicable to all new drugs approved through 
either centralized or mutual recognition procedure.208  The new formula is 
8+2+1;209 the data exclusivity will last for eight years from the time of 
marketing approval of the originator product, followed by two years of 
marketing exclusivity in which the generic product can be filed but cannot be 
marketed until the end of the ten-year period.210  The generic company can 
market its product even if the originator product was withdrawn from the 
market.211  A Bolar provision was added allowing the generic companies to do 
their tests before the expiration of the related patent.212  New use was granted 
an additional year of data exclusivity for one time only, provided two 
conditions are met: first, the product must have been submitted for approval 
during the first eight years of the data exclusivity period; and, second, the new 
use must have significant clinical benefit as compared to the existing usage.213  
Other modifications such as new dosage form or new strengths were not eligible 
for this period.214  During the additional one-year new use exclusivity period, 
the generic product cannot be marketed even for the old use.215 
Additionally, switching from Rx (prescription) to OTC (over-the counter) 
will be granted one-year protection period if the switch was based on significant 
clinical or preclinical testing.216  The generic company can market its product 
as a prescription product.217 
 
204.  Junod, supra note 5, at 511–14. 
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D. India 
There is no distinct law to protect the disclosure of confidential information 
in India;218 existing provisions regarding the undisclosed information of 
pharmaceuticals can be found in India’s Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (as 
corrected up to November 30, 2004) rule 53219 provides that the drug regulator 
should not disclose any confidential information to a third party without prior 
written approval from relevant superior officials.220  In addition, India has 
implemented many rules related to patents that aim to increase access to 
medicines while still complying with TRIPS obligations; such obligations 
include restricting the scope of patentability, increasing the grounds for 
compulsory license issuance.221  Since 2007, the European Union and India 
have been in negotiations to reach consensus on the terms of a bilateral 
agreement between the two countries; however, as of now, these negotiations 
have failed to produce any such agreement.222 
In 2005, India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare amended Schedule 
Y of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules (2005).223  These new amendments waive 
the requirements of the toxicological and clinical of new drugs for life 
threatening diseases, as deemed appropriate by the drug regulator.224  In 2004, 
an Inter-ministerial committee was established as a consultative group on this 
matter, and in 2007, this committee released the Reddy Report.225  The Reddy 
Report concluded that existing legal provisions were inadequate to meet the 
obligations imposed by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.  Consequently, 
the Reddy Report recommended existing law be amended in order to be in 
compliance with Article 39.3.226 
The report proposed numerous scenarios, one of which envisioned a data 
protection period of five years for a pharmaceutical product that contains a new 
chemical entity from the date of first marketing authorization anywhere in 
world.227 This report recommends some conditions for applying data 
protections, such as the recommendation that protection should be granted only 
 
218.  REDDY & SANDHU, supra note 148, at 30 –33. 
219.  Noti. ***[No. F. 28-10/45-H (1)], Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare [Department of Health]. 
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for new chemical entity and not for new uses or other modifications.228  Also, 
this protection term for a patented drug would be limited to the patent term in 
India.  Further, the report suggests a maximum period of twenty-four months, 
from the time of an originator’s first marketing approval anywhere in the world, 
in which the originator company should apply for marketing approval in India. 
It should be launched within six months of the approval date in India.229  
Another condition was to start the data protection period from the first 
marketing approval date anywhere in the world.  The Reddy Report justified its 
recommendations regarding the implementation of a more expansive data 
protection system and other related intellectual property rights,230 by 
hypothesizing that India’s current protection legislation, that which the Report 
found to be inadequate, could lead to the international perception of India as a 
country that did not fully protect innovation.231   
Consequently, this negative image of India in the international community 
could limit India’s ability to enter many conventions, such as the 
Pharmaceuticals Inspection Convention/Pharmaceuticals Inspection 
Cooperation Scheme (PIC/S).232  This in turn could negatively impact a generic 
producer’s ability to export to other countries, because the United States will 
increase the number of bilateral agreements with other countries.  These 
bilateral agreements have stricter intellectual property rights that prohibit 
parallel importation than those encompassed in TRIPS.233 
India has been listed on the Special 301 Priority Watch List from the first 
report on 1989 until now.234  On its submission for the Special 301 of 2014, the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) requested 
to include India on the priority watch list,235 based on India’s current 
insufficient intellectual property legislation and the market access barriers. 
Lack of data protection was one point mentioned on this report.236  For example, 
India’s current practice when granting regulatory approval is to rely on the 
approval of another country when approving an originator product, and there is 
no need to submit the test data.237  According to (PhRMA), this practice is 
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234.  PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, SPECIAL 301 
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01-submission.pdf [hereinafter PhRMA]. 
235.  Id. 
236.  Id. 
237.  Id. 
NSOUR.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2017  12:06 AM 
296 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 20:2 
 
inconsistent with Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement and ultimately leads to 
unfair commercial use.238 
E. Egypt 
As with India, Egypt does not provide data protection for test data 
submitted by the originator companies.  Article 56 paragraph 2 of the Egyptian 
IP law states “The competent authorities who receive such information shall 
protect it against disclosure and unfair commercial use from the date of its 
submission to the competent authorities until it is no longer confidential, or for 
a period not exceeding five years, whichever comes first.”239  According to 
Article 56, the Egyptian health authority does not consider reliance on an 
originator’s submitted data to approve a generic product as an act of unfair 
commercial use, a determination based on the rationale that this reliance does 
not involve the disclosure of the test data to the generic company.240 
Like India, PhRMA requested to list Egypt on the Priority Watch list of 
2014 because of its deteriorating intellectual property environment and because 
of barriers to market access.241  The above practices in implementing test data 
protection is proof that members of the WTO can apply the obligations of 
Article 39.3 in different ways that suited their needs and interest. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Each WTO member should choose the right approach that best suits its 
country, taking public welfare issues into consideration.  To ensure that public 
welfare issues have received due consideration, WTO members should re-
evaluate the approach they have implemented/employed, to evaluate its effect 
on the public health and access to medicines relative to other approaches and 
benefit from other members experiences. 
Data exclusivity provisions were not the best option for developing 
countries, as they have undermined people’s accessibility to affordable 
medicine and have had a negative impact on the local pharmaceutical industry. 
 We argue that the bans-on-misappropriation approach facilitates the 
early entry of a generic product directly after the originator product is approved, 
and takes maximum advantage of TRIPS flexibilities.  According to Article 
39.3 of TRIPS, test data must be protected in accordance with relevant domestic 
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240.  Id. 
241.  PhRMA, supra note 234. 
NSOUR.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2017  12:06 AM 
2016] TEST DATA PROTECTION 297 
 
laws on unfair competition.  Unfairness is limited to the means of access to the 
data by the competitor, not by the regulators. 
The test data of the originator will be protected against what national law 
defines as unfair use of the data, so reliance on original test data when assessing 
the bioequivalence study of a generic company will not be considered to be 
unfair.  This approach is considered to be a very good alternative to the data 
exclusivity approach for developing countries. 
 
 
